Abstract. Kant'sm oral theologyw as as ubject of intense debate in the earlyr eception of Kant'sphilosophy. At the same time, Kant'snotion of practical postulation held considerable interest for Fichte, Schelling,and Hegel. What Iseekto show is the systematic connection of these twofacts: examination of the ways in which Kant'sp ostulates of pure practical reason exposed the Kantian system to criticism sheds light,Iargue, on some of the fundamental moves made by the German Idealists in their transformation of Kant'sp hilosophy.
Ia mn ot of course goingt oa ttempt to go over all of this territory,o re venv ery much of it.I np articular,Iwills ay little about Hegel. What Iw ant to explore, with reference to Fichtea nd Schelling, is the idea of al ogical continuity from Kant'sconception of practical postulation to the formation of post-Kantian idealism. The notion Iwish to make plausible is thatthe references to Kant'spractical postulates scattered across German Idealist texts reflectasystematic connection, can be described in aunifiedway,and which casts light on both the reasons why at ransitionwas made from Kantianism to the post-Kantian idealisms, and also the means by which it was effected.¹ This is therefore something more than asimple claim of historical influence, but it is obviouslyn ot to sayt hat the moral theologya nd practical postulates hold ag olden key to the German Idealist development,a nd Ia mn ot going to enter anyclaim about their relative weighti nc omparison with other motivating sources internal to Kant'ssystem. In fact,what Ihope will come clear is that that would be the wrong wayofviewing the role playedbythe postulates, which has to do not so much with substantive first-order issues -the self, freedom, skepticism,etc. -but rather,atametaphilosophical level, with how those issues are taken up.
That there should have been much engagement with Kant'sm oral theology on the part of the German Idealists,and that anyofitshould be positive,asitis in the System-Programme, is in away somewhat surprising.The moraltheology is the most philosophicallyc onservative part of Kant'ss ystem, the point where Critical philosophys upplies the "practico-dogmatic metaphysics" which rejoins and redeems the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy, and the theism for which it provides does not form part of the motivatingagenda of the Wissenschaftslehre, and is explicitlyrejected by Schelling in his earlydays.² Indeed, parting company with theism -and rejectingthe idea that reconstruction of religious orthodoxy is anyc riterion of philosophicals uccess -seems to be one of the features which distinguishest he German Idealist development from the earlyK ant reception of Reinhold et al.,a nd which in the eyes of manyh elps to give it ac ongenially late modern character.
Furthermore, it is not easy to see how the standing of Kant'smoral theology in the earlyt om id 1790s -on the one hand subjectt of iercea nd effective philosophical criticism, and on the other endorsed and appropriated by religious conservatives³ -could have led aprogressive Kantian to consider it apromising part of the Critical system to fix their attentiono n. But what Iw ill alsot ry to show is that the difficulties of the moral theologyare part of the systematic connection; the problems of Kant'smoral theologyhelp to define the philosophical solutions of German Idealism.⁴ My discussion falls into four parts. In the first Il ookatt he use made of the concept of apostulate in Fichteand Schelling, and in the second at the problems of Kant'sm oral theology. The third part spells out their systematic connection. The fourth part reviews contrasting treatments of the same Kantian material in Beck, Fries, and Novalis. 1T he postulates in German Idealism
Fichte
Fichte'suse of the concept of apostulate or postulation runs from the beginning to the end of his philosophical development.A fter beginning to rethink Kant's moral theologyinthe Kritikaller Offenbarung,whereFichteclaims that transcendental idealismi tself -the doctrine thatt hingsa re appearances not thingsi n themselves -is "just as much apostulate of practical reason as atheoremoftheoretical reason" (Fichte1978, p. 25 [FW:V , 36] ),⁵ the concept recurs in earlywrit-ingsfrom the period when Fichtewas preparingthe Wissenschaftslehre, the "Eigene Meditationen" and "Praktische Philosophie",w heret he primary proposition thatIam aware of my Ich is referred to as ap ostulate or "Heischesatz" ((Fichte1 971a, [FW/GA: II, III, [26] [27] [28] 4 9-50,1 00]), and (Fichte1 971b, [FW/ GA:I I, III, 265] )),⁶ said to express the very intuition which it demands;⁷ and as late as 1812 Fichtet alks of the "Postulat" of the "appearance of the absolute as such",t he postulate of its projectiono fa" Bild" and representative of its own being.⁸ StandardlyF ichteu sest he concept of ap ostulate in foundational contexts which have to do with the unification of the theoretical and the practical, and hence with the basis of ontologicalt alk, and at pointsw heren one of the other and more familiar concepts in Fichte'sl exicon could express adequately the distinctive status of the claim that he wantst om ake.⁹ Three texts in particular reveal this.
requirement of the necessary unity of happiness and moral worth: Fichte treats that narrower notion, of the congruence of the fortunes of moral beingw ith their behaviour,a sd educible from the broader.F ichte'sc onception of the necessity of af undamental unification of realms goes back to his earlyr eflections on Kant'st hird Critique,h is Versuch eines erklärenden Auszug aus KantsKritik der Urteilskraft,wherehesaysthat the 'Vereinigungspunct' of Freedom and Nature must be 'weder theoretisch noch practisch' (Fichte 1962 , [FW/GA: II, I, [329] [330] ). Fichteis also much less insistent than Kant on the need for the theological postulates to enable effective moral motivation (consequentlyFichtedenies religion even subjective universal validity: (Fichte 1978,p.42[FW:V ,56-57] ). The overall tendency of the Kritik aller Offenbarung is thus to absorb Kant'santinomyofpractical reasoni nto the much moreg eneral and fundamentalp roblem, acknowledgedbyKant in the Introduction to the third Critique,ofthe 'Kluft' between Freedomand Nature ( Kant 2000,[ AA 5:175 -176] ). It is to be noted that,a tt his point,F ichte is not aimingt o modify the concept of apractical postulate, Kant'sdefinition of which he simplyrestates: apostulatei sat heorem immediatelyconnectedw ith reason'sr equirement of practical law, which is 'not commanded by the law',yet 'must necessarilybeassumed if reason is to be legislative',and which we call a 'belief' (Fichte1 978, p. 31 [FW:V , 41] ).  Twoi nterconnected reasons areg iven: that intuition is required, and that each can become awareo nlyo fh is own Ich. One formulation of the primaryp roposition entertained by Fichte is imperatival: 'Schaue Dein Icha n.' The second proposition, concerningt he necessity of consciousness of Nicht-Ich,i sa lso called ap ostulate. In (Fichte1 971b, [FW/GA: II, III, [190] [191] ), Fichte talks of an Erfahrung of our original strivinga spostulirt -' das Postuliren der Erfahrung … es soll empfunden werden können'-and of our havingcome to 'all possible practical postulates'.  'Die Anschauung, welche in diesem Satze gefordert wird, ist durch ihn selbst ausgedrückt', (Fichte1 971a, [FW/GA: II, III, 50] ).  '… ausdem Postulateder Erscheinung des Absoluten als solchen',(Fichte1971, [FW:X , 352] ).  Fichte'susage is not entirelyconsistent; in some contextsheuses the term as ameresynonym for positing ( Fichte1 982, pp. 196 and 260[ FW:I , 2 18 and 296] ).
(1) In the 1794 Grundlage Fichterefers to apostulate not formulated by Kant but which, he supposes, underlies Kant'sm oral theory (Fichte 1982,p p. 230n2 and 232[ FW:I ,2 60n and 263] ).¹⁰ Thisi st he "absolute postulate of conformity with the pure self",t he demand "that everything should conform to the self". Fichtes uggestst hat the categorical imperative is,o rm ay be considered "as", just this postulate. Whatever the justiceo ft his construal of Kant,the important point is what seems to be Fichte'sf urther claim, thatw hat the imperative requires,f or its intelligibility,i satheoretical grounding. It requires the notion that "the self is itself absolute": "Only because and insofar as the self is itself absolute[Nur weil,und inwiefern das Ich selbst absolut ist],does it have the right to postulate absolutely." (Fichte1982, p. 230n2 [FW:I, 260n] ). FichtesaysthatKant could never "have arriveda tt he categoricali mperative' without 'presupposing an absoluteb eing of the self [absoluten Seyns des Ich]".¹¹ This immediatelyraises the question: Is Fichtethinkingofthe absoluteself, with its absolute being,asametaphysical ground?Orisitamere ideational correlate, the theoretical echo as it were, of apractical norm?The first is suggested by Fichte'sclaim that the absolutebeing of the self is the "ground of the authority [Grund der Befugniss]" of the absolutepostulate,¹² and the second by the fact that his broader intention is, we know,t oi ns ome wayg round theoretical on practical reason.
The passages later in the Grundlage whereF ichtet ells us what it means for the self to have absoluteb eing favour the second interpretation, but fail to fully  The theism of Kant'smoral theology,m oreo rless conserved in the Kritik aller Offenbarung, has by this point disappeared. Fichte'st heological views aren ot on open displayi nt he Grundlage but can be gleaned from the contemporaneous 'Praktische Philosophie' (Fichte1971b, [FW/ GA:II, III, 238] ): belief in the existenceofGod derivesfromthe subject'soriginal striving, which 'geht darauf hinaus,Gott zu werden';i nt he Trieb to discover God shines the law, 'werde selbst Gott'.Fichtedescribes this result of his investigation as a 'guter Fund'.This is not in fact the position that Fichte defends publicallyinhis later essayondivine governance(Fichte1994), but it is very close to the recognizablyF ichtean analysis that Friedrich Karl Forberga rticulated (Forberg1 912), precipitatingt he Atheismusstreit.  In one placeF ichte contrasts the Wissenschaftslehre,w hich distinguishes 'absolute being' from 'real existence' and takest he former as ag round for the latter,w ith Stoicism, which does not distinguish them (Fichte1 982, p. 245n ote4 [FW:I , 2 78n] ).  The point is this: Fichte has claimed that the moral imperative of the moral lawpresupposes an assertoric, non-imperativalground, so it cannot be Fichte'sview that we grasp what it is for the self to be absolute merely by assentingtocertain norms;the absoluteness of the self is what is supposed to ground (rationalize our assent to)t hose norms.This reading is suggested, moreover,byremarks in 'Praktische Philosophie' (Fichte 1971b , [FW/GA: II, III, 238] ) to the effect that the unconditioned is not realized in theoretical reason (for which it is merely regulative), but that purer eason, in the pure Ich, realizes absoluteu nity (though only for the pure Ich).
clarify the situation (Fichte1 982, (244) (245) (277) (278) ). Fichtes ayst hatt he self is infinite, "but merelyi nr espect to its striving": it merely strives to be infinite (Fichte1982, p. 238 [FW:I, 270] ). Again, he says that the self demands thatitencompass all reality,thatthis demand restsonthe idea of the absolutelyposited infinite self, and thatthe meaning of the principle, the self posits itself absolutely,becomes clear whenweappreciate that we are speaking of "an idea of the self which must necessarilyu nderlie its infinite practical demand" (Fichte1 982,p .2 44 [FW:I ,2 77],i talics added). But this justl eavesu s with the puzzle of whyFichtei nthe earlier passagea ttributed absolute being to the self, and of how an idea which does not (yet) possess an object,c an lend authority to ap ractical demand.¹³ Iw ill come back to this,b ut for the moment the point is just thatF ichte drawsad irect connection of foundational issues in the Wissenschaftslehre with Kant'sc oncept of practical postulation, while seeming to depart from the pattern of Kantian practical postulation. Rather he seems to have in mind and see the need for some development of Kant'sn otion -Fichtes eems to envisage some sort of reflexive structure in which "ought" and "is" double up and validate one another.
(2)T his supposition is borneo ut in the "new presentation" of the Wissenschaftslehre (novam ethodo)( Fichte1 992).H ereF ichtet ells us that the Wissenschaftslehre begins, as all philosophym ust,w ith ap ostulate, but it is one "that is grounded in an Act [Thathandlung] and not in a fact",where "Thathandlung" means: "what occurs when Il et my Ia ct within itself and observew hat happens",n amely the construction of aw orld, "ac ontinuallyp rogressings ynthesis" (Fichte1 992, pp. 109 -110 [FW/GA: IV, I II, [344] [345] ).¹⁴ We might briefly wonder if Fichtew ants us to understand by postulate anything more than is in- The ambiguity concerning ontological commitment,againinconnection with the concept of ap ractical postulate, is present also in Fichte'sa ccounto fh uman freedom in his review of Creuzer,w here he describes 'manifestationo fa bsolute activity in the determinationo ft he will' as a Postulat of the moral law ( Fichte 1971,p .2 93 [FW:VIII, 413] ), and recommendst hat the question of whether we should think of this activity which supplies the 'real ground' of empirical acts of will as 'the cause',t he Ursache,o ft he will'sb eingd etermined, should be answeredn egatively: the sufficient ground of determinations of the will is not to be identified with 'an actual real ground ' (Fichte1 971, p. 294 [FW:V III, 414] ). Forageneral discussion of the issue of the Wissenschaftslehre'so ntological status,s ee (Gardner 2007) .  Alternative specifications of the primarypostulateare given: 'that this free activity of his Iis that principle that cannot be derivedfromanythingelse ' (Fichte1992, p. 95 [FW/GA: IV,III, 335] ); 'Constructt he concept of the Ia nd observeh ow youa ccomplish this' (Fichte1 992, p. 119 [FW/ GA:IV, III, 349] ). Laterthe postulateisadded that: 'TheIappears outside of itself,asitwere,and makes itself into an object' (Fichte1 992, p. 138 [FW/GA: IV, I I, 44] ). volved in the basic Euclidean geometrical case,¹⁵ but all such doubts are removed when he later writes: "Moreover,t he scope of Kant'sp ractical postulate is toon arrow,f or he limits it entirely to belief in God and immortality;b ut we will see thatc onsciousness in its entirety is included within this postulate." (Fichte1 992, p. 298 [FW/GA: IV, I I, 139] )
The postulate to which Fichteisreferringhere is Kant'sclaim that "Iought to do something;therefore, what Iought to do must be possible"-which is equivalent,Fichtesays, to his own claim that the Imust effect,within my thinking and my willing,atransition from determinability to determinacy.¹⁶ So the operative conception of postulate here is not justapostulate in the basic Euclidean sense but explicitlyt ied to Kant'sm oral theology. Fichtea ttributes Kant'sn ot having presented his philosophya sawhole under the rubric of at ransition from Ought to Is, i. e. as as et of postulates,t ot he order in which the Critiques werecomposed; to have done so would have required Kant to go back and laboriouslyr evise his critique of theoretical reason. In other words, had Kant begun with atreatment of the I "as it is for itself",instead of treatingitasan"accident" of "sensible, objectivethinking",then he would have arrivedatthe postulates of the Wissenschaftslehre.
(3) In the 1804 lectures,F ichtea ttempts to recast the Wissenschaftslehre in terms that will show it to possess the virtues claimed for Schelling'sidentity system; that is, he wishes to show that his own system is no merelyo ne-sided, merelys ubjective idealism, but that it grasps as much of the absolutea sc an be thought possible. Fichtep roceeds by playing off different formulationso fr ealism and idealisma gainst one another,i nawayt hat leads to their successive refinement and finallyt ot he insight of non-objectified being, "ab eing in pure act" which is "self-enclosed oneness with itself" (Fichte2 005,p .1 16 [FW:X , 206] ).¹⁷ This concludes the first of his two major tasks.
 Fichte draws the analogy with geometry,( Fichte1 992, p. 110 [FW/GA: IV, I II, [344] [345] ), no doubt with Beck (whom he has just been discussing) in mind.  Moreexactly, Fichte describes Kant'sprinciple as analytic, and his own as synthetic (Fichte 1992, p. 297 [ FW/GA: IV, I I, [138] [139] ).  'simple, purebeingasabsolute, self-enclosed oneness ' (Fichte2005,p.120 [FW:X,212] ), 'an unconditionallyself-enclosed, livingoneness ' (Fichte2005,p.147 [FW:X,245 ]) which we do not go toward,f or the reason that we ourselves are (in) it; our insight is that 'beingi tself is an absolute I',orW e (Fichte 2005,pp. 117and 120[FW:X,207 and 212] ), because it is not just already constructed but self-constructing (Fichte2 005,p .1 22 [FW:X ,2 14 -215], which refers back: the beingw hich we had insighti nto 'constructs itself, and … is onlyi nt his self-construction'). This beingis'entirely of itself,initself,and throughitself',where this 'self' involves no antithesis (of subject and object) because it is 'grasped with the requisiteabstraction purelyinwardly … as Ia mm ost ferventlyc onscious of graspingi t '(Fichte2 005,p .116 [FW:X ,2 05]).
The second task, which we are set as soon as the first is completed,¹⁸ is to "deducef rom the first part,a sn ecessary and true appearance, everything which up to now we have let go as merelye mpirical and not intrinsically valid" (Fichte2005,p .121 [FW:X , 213] ), what Fichtec alls "factical existence".¹⁹ And the difficulty we face here is thato fa voiding an irrational gap, hiatum,o f the kind that confronts us, Fichtec laims, when we consider the relation of consciousnesst oo bjects:²⁰ the relation of pure being to appearance should not reproduce the "inexplicable and inconceivable" character of that relation.
Fichte'sfirst step towards asolution is to hypothesize arelation of "Sollen", staked on the condition of our own cognition into the essence or ground of being: If the cognition -the "absolute insight" (Fichte 2005,p .1 25 [FW:X , 218] ) -that we achieved in completingt he first task is to be possible, then being should (es soll)c onstruct itself in aw ay that allows it to make itself known to us. Fichtec alls this the ideal self-construction of being (Fichte 2005, p. 123[ FW:X ,2 15] ). He then asks us to reflect on the essence of this Sollen, and says that:
… an inner self-construction is expressed in the 'should':a ninner,absolute, pure, qualitative self-making and resting-on-itself … It is, Isay,an'inner self-construction',completelyas such: nothing else supports the hypothetical 'should',excepti ts inner assumption entirely by itself and without anyground [die innere Annahme durchaus vonsich selber und ohne allen aüssern Grund] …' Inner assumption entirely by itself' Ih aves aid: hence ac reation from nothing, producingi tself as such. A 'restingo ni tself' Ih aves aid, because … it falls back into nothingwithout this continuingpursuit of inward, livingassumption [innerlich lebendigenAnnahme] and creation fromnothing. Hence it is the self-creatorofits own  The transition from the first to the second takesp lacei nL ecture1 6. The part of the text which Ia mc oncerned with in what follows runs from this point in Lecture1 6t oL ecture21i nclusive.  (Fichte2005,p.122 [FW:X , 214] ): 'being'sf actical existencei nt he form of external, objectifyingexistence'.Fichtespecifies the targetindifferent ways: 'if we wanted to come to something morethan the one being, for example to the latter'sway of appearing … primordial appearance; and so consciousness' (Fichte2 005,p .1 28 [FW:X ,2 22]); '… if appearance is to arise' (Fichte 2005,p.146 [FW:X,245] ); 'this entiremanifold as it occurs empirically … to present appearance in general and as such ' (Fichte2005,p.147 [FW:X,246] ); we seek to explain apriori appearance and its 'principle of the manifold' (Fichte 2005,p.147 [FW:X,246] ), 'the resolution of the puzzle of the world and of consciousness ' (Fichte2 005, p .151 [FW:X , 2 51] ).  Not,note,merely spatiallyouter objects,but all statesofaffairs which aretaken to obtain, to be matters regarding which therei struth,i ncluding our own Denken,i ns of ar as we have Cartesian certain consciousness of thinking: see (Fichte 2005,p .111 [FW:X ,199 -200] Fichtei sr eferringh ere to an act which is normatively conceptualized but expresses an ontological ground, an ontologically creative ground.
The crux of Fichte'sargument -on which rests the anti-skeptical forceofthe Wissenschaftslehre, as well as his claim that its idealismi s( pace Schelling's criticisms)ahigher realism -is his claim that we can convert this hypothetical Sollen into "something categoricaland absolute",because it can be regarded, not merelyasacondition for our cognition,but also as a principleofpure being itself (Fichte2005,p.126 [FW:X, 219] ). The antecedent -If we are to have insight,then …-falls away,Fichteargues, leaving just the consequent: Being must construct itself as factical existenceo ra ppearance.²² As Fichtep uts it,the ideal self-con- Again: the should has 'been illuminated for us as an absolute that holds and sustains itself out of itself and through itself as such,ont he condition that it exists',whereby 'we have ac ategorical insight into the unchangeable, unalterable nature of the "should",a ni nsighti nwhich we can completely abstract from [its] outwardexistence ' (Fichte2005,pp. 131-132 [FW:X,227] ); the should is 'self-producingand self-sustaining' (Fichte 2005,p.134 [FW:X,230] ); 'the "should" is the basic principle for everything ' (Fichte2 005, p .135 [FW:X , 2 31] ).  Explicatingt his moveo ccupies Fichte throughout Lectures 17-21.Fichte'sa rgument for the conversion of the conditional necessity (if therea re to be appearanceso fw hich we have cognition, then being must …)into an unconditional necessity (being must …)isnot easy to makeout, but its nervei su ndoubtedlyt he conception of the former as an instanceo fSollen,t he importanceo fw hich for Fichte cannot be overstated: he refers to it as what differentiates his system from all those which have gone before( Fichte2 005,p p. 148 -149[ FW:X ,2 48]). The task is to 'eliminate' its 'hypothetical status',p uttingu si np ossession of the Sollen as a 'self-supporting principle' (Fichte 2005,p .1 30 [FW:X ,2 25] ). Fichte says that 'the most securem eans is to look it straight in the eye',whereby it loses itself or evaporates in insight into purebeing (Fichte 2005,p.130 [FW:X ,225] ). In one place, Fichtedescribes the searchfor the ground we areseeking as itself displayingthe reality of whatw eseek -'in order to state the true resultofy our desire … just to arrive at your demand',there must be an 'original seeing' (Fichte 2005,p.135 [FW: X, 232] ). The idea seems to be that the conversion is achieved by an alteration of, or abstraction from, form,which leavesj ust the purea wareness of content (Fichte2 005,p .1 44 [FW:X ,2 42 -243]): the imperatival normative form of the Sollen falls away,l eavingj ust insight;w e' let go of the proposition'sf orm',viz., of presupposition (Fichte 2005,p.149 [FW:X,249] ). This is supported by the places in which Fichte claims that our insight into purebeingt akesu stoapoint from which we can grasp its differentiation intoc ontrastingf orms (real and ideal) as merely downstream features, which change nothingregarding its essential content and identity;allowing is and ought to be regarded as,top ut it empirically, different aspects of one and the same thing.
Another strand in the text concerns our own reflexive appreciation of our presencei no ur reflections as knowers: Fichte tellsustoremember that the condition in the antecedent (our having cognition) is actually satisfied, not in the sense of anya ssumedd eterminatec ognition -struction of being encompasses alsoits real self-construction.²³ And once the Sollen has been grasped as categorical, not merelyhypothetical, Fichterefers to it as a postulate: he talks of the "postulate of the absolute necessity in the pure, positive in-itself" (Fichte2005,p.142 [FW:X, 240] ), "the postulate that inner being … must construct itself" (Fichte 2005,p 
Schelling
Schelling'searlywritings take up Kant'sconcept of practical postulation in close association with Fichte, but with severald ifferences. Foro ne thing,S chelling tells us explicitlyt hat that is what is he doing -self-consciouslya ppropriating and revisingK ant'sc onception. There are however also substantive pointso f contrast with Fichte, of which the first twoa re these. First,whereas for Fichte, Fichte'sisnot aregressive argument in that sense -but in the sense that we are candidates for possessingk nowledge,b eings for which the minimal and indeterminatep ossibilityo fk nowledge is assured by the very fact that we can ask what,whether,and how,wecan know anything; this allows us to grasp that we 'know ourselvesin 'the presupposition, and are 'knowing' (Fichte 2005,p p. 151, 153 [FW: X ,2 52,2 53]).
Also importantisFichte'sidea that we can and must in our reflection shakeoff the thought that the Sollen has validity merely relative to us,meaningthat being'sobligation (so to speak)to construct itself for our sake becomes being'so bligation to construct itself for its own sake. The sort of normativity that Fichteh as in mind by Sollen must be something like what we grasp in practical consciousness (a normative demand that is fulfilled by ad oing), and not the thinner normativity of theoretical reasoning.I tcannot be the latter alone, because in that case Fichte's references to doing as opposed to saying would makenosense, and no progress would therefore be made with the anti-skeptical task of validating the presuppositions of theoretical reason: Fichte argues that the enactment [Thun]inthe should is revealed to be categorical, even though its saying is hypothetical (Fichte2 005,p .1 42 [FW:X ,2 39]).
As Iunderstand it,when Fichte describesthe Sollen as insight into 'genesis' (absolute genesis; genesis of being, and beingasgenesis), we do not just grasp that something's being the case is acondition of the fulfilment of amere demand of ours,but that the demand inheres in being itself: we grasp being as having-to-be, as subject to its own self-addressed imperative,s ot o speak; at the very least we can abstract from the distinction of our own reflection and reason itself (Fichte2 005,p .1 52 [FW:X , 2 52] at least prior to 1804,the attraction of the practical postulates begins and ends with theiru nification of Freedom and Nature, for Schelling it lies not onlyi n their doing this but also, and more importantly, in their thereby taking us to the highestconcept or Ideal of Pure Reason. Second, and connectedly, Schelling disposes of anye quivocation concerning ontological commitment.
In the Appendix to his 1797-98 Abhandlungen zurE rläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre,S chelling spells out the reasons why "the first principle of philosophym ust be simultaneously theoretical and practical,i .e., a postulate" (Schelling 1994,p .1 34 [SW: 1, 446] ),²⁴ "neither theoretical nor practical alone [but] both at once [beides zugleich]" (Schelling 1994,p .1 35 [SW: I, 448] ). The principle of philosophycannot be theoretical, Schellingasserts, withoutsurrendering ab initio to dogmatism, nor however can it be practical, since practical propositions are mere imperatives. But in the concept of a postulate we find the theoretical and practical united, in so far as it concerns a "primordial construction" in inner sense,which is theoretical in form but which borrowsi ts compelling force( " zwingende Kraft")f rom the practical sphere (Schelling 1994, pp. 134 -135 [SW: I, 447-448] ).
This conception is preserved intacti nS chelling's1 800 System of Transcendental Idealism (Schelling 1978,p .3 
3[ SW:I II, 376]):
There is no possibility of our principle formingt he basis of both theoretical and practical philosophyifitbenot itself at oncetheoretical and practical. Now sinceatheoretical principle is a theorem [Lehrsatz] , while apractical one is a command,there must lie something in the middle between the two -and this is the postulate which borders on practical philosophy, sincei ti ss implyademand,a nd on theoretical,s incei ts demand is for a purely theoretical construction. Where the postulateg ets its coercive powerf rom, is at once explained by the fact that it is used for practical demands.Intellectual intuition is something that one can demand and expect; anyone wholacks the capacity for such an intuition ought at least to possess it.
The reasons Schellinggives here are therefore of a metaphilosophical kind, and prescind from the consideration thatw eh avei nf act located, thanks to Fichte, the particular and uniquelyappropriate content for the postulate which the system of philosophyr equires.The Fichteanc ontent of the postulate which in fact  If ocus on this text because it bringst oaconclusion the earlys eries -Über die Möglichkeit einer Form der Philosophie überhaupt (Schelling1 980a), VomI ch als Princip der Philosophie (Schelling1 980), and Philosophische Briefe (Schelling1 980b) -and summates Schelling's views at the end of this first crucial phase of his development,with close reference to Fichte. Schelling'sc onception of absolute cognition datesf rom VomI ch (Schelling1 980), but it is not until the 'Antikritik' that Schellingr eferst oi ta sapostulate( Schelling1 982, [SW: I, 444] ), which Schelling says is equivalent to the intellectual intuition which reveals to us the origin of self-consciousness (Schelling 1994,p p. 102, 116,135 [SW: I, 401, 420, 448] ).
These characterizations stand in rough agreement with Fichte, as his position stood in the Jena Wissenschaftslehre.²⁵ But Schelling'sf urther insight is that therei sa na lternative to Fichte'ss trategy of focussing on the Sollen in order to reach the point of identity of the theoretical and practical. On Schelling'sa lternative,w ec an layd irect claim to intellectual acquaintance with that which resolves itself immediately for reflection into distinct,t heoretical and practical factors,but which in itself is neither,and so can be both.²⁶ The absolutepostulate discloses the "original identity of the theoretical and the practical in us",a nd it represents for practical reason the 'absolutes tate' to be achieved, but it can do so onlybecause our intuition attains, as Schelling puts it in Plato's language, "an intuition of its archetype in the intellectual world" (Schelling 1994,p .1 11-112 [SW: I, 413 -415] ).²⁷ Fichte's ought is retained but demoted: for Schellingi ti sn ot that as which we grasp being-in-itself, as Fichteh as it in 1804 (Fichte 2005) , a ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi,b ut merelyt he basis on which we are entitled to postulate the universal validity of our intellectual self-intuition (Schellinga rgues: since all are capable of heedingt he morall aw, all possess the capacity for such intuition) (Schelling1 994,p p. 112,1 13,1 16, 134 [SW: I, [414] [415] 416, 420, and 446] ).
Schellingthereby removes, as Isaid, the ambiguity regarding the ontological significanceo ft he absolutep ostulate.A nd he takesc are to explain how this is  In particular,with how Fichte presents the Wissenschaftslehrei nt he Second Introduction (Fichte1 994a).  Schellingdefines apostulateas'the requisite of a primordial (transcendental) construction', without referencetothe primacyofpractical reason,( Schelling1994,p.137 [SW: I, 451] ).A tthis stage,S chellingt akes Fichte to sharet his concept of ap ostulate: see (Schelling 1994,p .1 37n [SW: I, 451n] ).  See also (Schelling1 980b, p. 180 [SW: I, 318] ). Such apoint is not merely the node of coordination of practical and theoretical reason,but lies aboveboth. Schellingdoes not draw attention to this departurefromF ichte, and it is obscured by the fact that so much of whatSchelling says -concerning theoretical philosophya s' presupposing' practical philosophy ( Schelling 1994,p .1 01 [SW: 399] ), and of the necessity of grasping oneself as pure autonomy, freedom, etc. -seems to merely recapitulate Fichte.The derivative character of the practical, for Schelling, is nonetheless reaffirmed at (Schelling1994,p.114 [SW: I, 417] ) -the absolute postulate 'contains the first reason for the practicallyuniversal postulates '-and (Schelling1994,p.124 [SW: I, 433] ): the primordial Sollen has its ground in knowledge itself.
possible. Propositions which predicate existence are theoretical,²⁸ Schelling says, but there is another mode, he argues, in which existenceisgrasped in transcendental cognition, to which must correspond ad istinct sense of existence -"Seyn" as opposed to "Daseyn".²⁹ "Seyn" is what the neither-theoretical-norpractical absolutep ostulate is concerned with. Thus what threatens to be, as Schellingnotes,a"paradox"-namely that one cannot sayofthe self qua "principle of all reality" that it "exists",since it "possesses none of the predicatesthat attach to things"-is resolvedbysaying that the self is beingitself, "es das Sein selbst ist" (Schelling1 978, p. 32 [SW: III, [375] [376] ).³⁰
The further point to be emphasized -which Iwill come to later -concerns the importance of Kant'sm oral theologyfor guiding Schellingt oh is conception of ap ostulate,which is not just ad istillation from his readingo fF ichte.
2T he problemso fK ant'sm oral theology
First responses to the moralt heology
In order to grasp how exactlyF ichtea nd Schelling'su ses of the concept of a practical postulate relatetoand emerge from Kant,weneed to go back to an earlier point in the historical story and consider the first wave of responses to Kant's moral theology.³¹
To an impartial observer of earlyK ant reception, Kant'sm oral theology would have appeared by the earlytomid-1790s to have emergedf rom the intensive discussion which it had provoked as at least highlyp roblematic, and this outcome would moreover have been taken as putting aq uestion-mark over the coherencea nd integrity of Kant'sp hilosophya sawhole. The reasons whyt he  '… ein Satz, der ein Daseyn aussagt',( Schelling1 994,p .1 34 [SW: I, [446] [447] [SW: I, 309n ]): we aretodistinguish the actual (Wirklichen)and the existing (Daseyenden), from being (dem Seyenden); Descartesand Spinoza spokeofabsolutes Seyn,which our 'empirical age' misapprehended in terms of the purec oncept of existence (Daseyn).  This supplies also Schelling'sa nswert ot he question, which we might raise, of how a demand-for-a-construction can avoid fallinga sunder into two components,( i) the demand, and (ii) its object, the theorem.  Foramoredetailed account,see (Gardner 2011) , which this section of the papersummarizes and draws on. moral theologyheld such importance for the fate of the Critical system are both historical and systematic. Reinhold had made strident claims for the moral theologya st he solution to the Aufklärung'sl ongstanding difficulty in reconciling reason and religion, claims which matched Kant'so wn statements on the topic; and the specific difficulties which had been identified in criticism of the moral theologyh ad, as Kant'sc ritics took pains to emphasize, direct implications for one'su nderstanding and evaluation of the transcendental project as such.
One set of objectionstoK ant'smoral theologyconcernedthe claims regarding the relation of morality and happiness which Kant makes in the course of arguingthat there existsanantinomyofpractical reason, which finds its unique resolution in the theological postulates of personal immortality and the existenceo fG od.T hese problems are of ar elatively low-level sort,a nd were adequatelyr esolvedb yK ant'sd efenders through elucidation of what is meant by positing the highest good as an ecessary object of will which is nonetheless not acondition of validity of the moral law. Fichte's Kritik aller Offenbarung provides such elucidation (Fichte 1978, § §2-3) . The objections which are of much greater interest concern two different matters: first,Kant'saccount of the relation of theoretical andpractical reason involved in practical postulation, and second, the epistemic status ando ntological commitment of the theological postulates.
Regarding the first of these, the point was hammeredhomeagain and again by Kant'sc ritics -inclusive of Flatt,F eder, Schulze, Wizenmann, though many others could be cited -that Kant'si nvocation of what he calls the primacy of practical reason to rationalize the sanctioning by theoretical reason of the propositions which practical reason claims as "practical cognitions" of the supersensible, fails to achievecoherence. The objection was formulated in different ways, but the common element is acomplaint thatK ant'sm ovefrom a need of practical reason to ah olding-true, "Fürwahrhalten",v iolates the independence and autonomyo ft heoretical reason.
The most forceful statement of the second difficulty is found in Jacobi's Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus and then again in Vonden göttlichen Dingen ( (Jacobi 1968, pp. 175 -195) and (Jacobi 1968a, pp. 340 -378) ). These are relatively late texts -respectively1 801 and 1811 -but Iw ill concentrate on them because they articulate in incisive and amplified terms thingsthat anti-Kantians such as Wizenmanna nd Schulze had been saying in the 1780s and 90s.
Jacobi
1. In Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus,J acobi reappliest oK ant'sp ostulates the same type of criticism that he had applied previouslyt oK ant'sc laim of empirical realism in the supplement, "On Transcendental Idealism",t oh is David Hume (1787) book (Jacobi 1994,p p. 331) . Accordingt oJ acobi, the difference between the two cases, which are otherwise parallel, concerns merely which faculties are involved, with reason occupyingi nt he case of the practical postulates the place occupied by the understanding in empirical knowledge.
The objection is that Kant'so wn account of the subjective genesis of the ideas of reason, not merelyfails to positively endow them with epistemic authority,but makes it impossible to regard them as having anyc ognitive significance whatever.I ti si mpossible, Jacobi says,t oh avea n" honest, wholehearted confidence" in reason'si deas of God, freedom and immortality,s ince we are on Kant'sa ccount "clearlyi nstructed by the origin, the constitution and the inner essence of these ideas" thatthey are only "Fictionen"-they arise in us onlybecause they are necessitatedt od os ob yt he conceptual operations of the understanding,asneeded in order to provide bounds for its extension, and so can only be taken as deceptive horizons, not as thingsexisting for and in themselves(Jacobi 1968, pp. 100 -103).³² Kant'sc laim that religious belief is rationallyn ecessitatedb ym oral consciousnesst hus requires, so Jacobi argues, theoretical reason to seta side its commitment to truth, and in anycase leavesusonlyinthe peculiar reflective position of knowing thato ur subjective constitution compels us to endorse certain representations, ones which, Kant'sown theory of that constitution instructs, are for us necessarilywithoutobjective significance.And since the final end, and ultimate justification, of the entire Critical undertaking,accordingtoKant himself, was preciselyt osave the three practicallys ignificant ideas of reason, we can conclude from his failureinthat broader endeavour,Jacobi claims, that the Critical project as such runs aground. And so -Jacobi tells us, drawinga ne ven broader,m ores weeping conclusion -must anya ttempt to philosophize on the basis of mere conceptsi na bstraction from divine intuitional input (Jacobi 1968a, p. 192) .
 As Jacobi puts it in (Jacobi 1968a, pp. 376 -378) : If reason relates onlytothe understanding, and this onlyt os ensibility,and if cognition ascends onlygraduallyfroma ppearances to ideas, then Kant is right,against Plato:the ideas arethen expanded concepts of understanding, without provable objective validity,a nd if their Kantian deduction is correct, then therei sn othing morep erverse than to proceed from ideas.
In the later text, Vond en göttlichen Dingen,J acobi − on the search for ever deeper diagnoses of the pathologies of philosophical reason -offers an extended reconsideration of the moralt heologyi nl ight of post-Kantian idealism. This text is of particulars ignificancef or the caseIam trying to make, since here Jacobi expresses the view − at ar elatively late point,a fter German Idealism has developedinto amature state − that the moral theologyfunctioned as al ogical triggerf or the German Idealist development.
Kant himself, Jacobi declares,i st horoughlyi nnocent of anti-theistic intentions. YetK ant bears an indirect responsibility for Fichtea nd Schelling,t he twin "daughters" of Critical philosophy, since theirphilosophies are merelyconsistent applications of his principle that onlyw hat the subject has produced,or constructed,can the subject cognize (Jacobi 1968a, pp. 351-352) .³³ This principle doubleswith another: that wissenschaftlicherBeweis is required for all claims to knowledge.
Accordingt oJ acobi, the practical postulates represent Kant'se ndeavour to salvage the ideas of God, freedom and immortality in the face of these principles. The reality of the objects of the ideas of reason was for Kant,Jacobi thinks, wholly axiomatic, abasic conviction, but Kant'scommitment to Wissenschaft precluded the epistemology which (giventhe impossibility of atheoretical proof of God's existence) this conviction entailed, namelyJ acobi'so wn epistemology of immediate revelations of reason, since to affirm such original cognitions would be to affirm truths without the possibilityofproof.Kant was thus forced into the compensatory strategyofraising up practical reason, renderingcognition of the objects of reason mediate,inorder to preserveatleast the appearance of proof (Jacobi 1968a, pp. 351-367).³⁴ HadK ant followed to its logical conclusionh is principle of the necessity of construction for the conceptual grasping of objects, then he would have arrivedatthe position of Fichte -anihilismwhich dissolves being into productions of thought -and ultimatelya tt he atheistic materialist  The Kern of Kant'srevolution is that we grasp (begreifen, einsehen)anobject onlyinsofar as we have it comei nto our beingi nt hought,a re capableo fc reating it in our understanding (Jacobi1 968a, p. 351; restated on p. 354). Jacobi mayber eading Kant in the light of J. S. Beck and Fichte,but he is of course right that the principle is one which Kant accepts: 'we can onlyunderstand and communicatetoothers what we ourselvescan produce' (Kant 1999,p.482 [AA11:515] ). See also Reflexionen2394, 'Wirsehen nichts ein, als was wir machen können' (Kant 2005,p.42 [AA1 6:344] ) and 2398, 'Wirb egreifen nur,was wir selbst machen können' (Kant 2005,p.42[AA 16:345] ).  As Kant lowered reason in theoretical philosophy, he raised it up in the practical part,and so was twice right,a nd twice wrong;K ant failed to combine his double right into as ingle, simple and complete one, but rather remained split,ambiguous and equivocal (Jacobi1968a, pp. 364-367). naturalism of Schelling.³⁵ Kant avoided this catastrophe onlyatthe cost of equivocation; the correct responset oh is predicament would have been to abandon his commitment to the necessity of wissenschaftlichenB eweis (Jacobi 1968a, pp. 365 -366) .
2. Whatever we make of Jacobi'sa rgument,i ti sh ard to denyt hat the practical postulates from Kant'st exts without ac lear and determinateo ntological status. Strictlyt herea re twoi ssues here: whether or not it is required,f or Kant'sp urposes, thatt he postulates be ontologicallyc ommitted; and whether or not in anyc ase Kantianism has the resourcest oprovide for it.J acobi affirms the first and denies the second,³⁶ while anti-realist interpreters of Kant denyboth ((Forberg1912) , and in our day, (Neiman 1994,Ch. 4) ). But what matters for pres- As Jacobi plots the historical story in Vonden göttlichen Dingen (Jacobi 1968a, pp. 372-394) : Kant'sphilosophywas orientated from the outset towards the defenceofscienceinthe sense of empiricalknowledge,and so he prioritized the understandingoverreason. Understanding falls, however,under the shadow of reason: it cannot help wanting to view all things transcendently, and in relation to as ingle principle. Reason does in fact have, intuitively,t ranscendent knowledge,but understanding cannot allow this. What it does instead is to substitute for reason'soriginal intuitive knowledge certain ideal constructs that arei ndeed also products of reason, but which aremade up of abstractions derivedfromthe understanding, and which have no content of their own. These abstractions then eclipse the actual knowledge that reason has:because reason is unable to recognize the knowledge that it genuinelyhas in the abstractions that have been constructedf or the sakeo ft he understanding,i te nds up treating its original ideas as mere illusions.F ichte followed suit,but reconstructed the whole of nature apriori from logic. The fact that the resulting reconstruction has no content of its own, and needs to derive its content from the material details of nature, led inevitablytoits conversion into aform of materialism; Schelling made the necessity of this movee xplicit.Thus Kantianism reaches the same result as Spinoza. In sum, on Jacobi'saccount,philosophyarrivesatnaturalism either directly, along Spinoza'sr oute, or via ac ircuitoust ranscendental excursus: transcendental philosophyi sb ound to resolve itself inton aturalism, either because it givesp riority to empirical knowledge claims, or because, even when does it not do so, its commitment to pure ap riori thought,a sa gainst intuition and Gefühl,leavesits constructions without anyreality or content,and in order to correctt his deficiency, it must surrender itself to nature.  The ontological problem is restatedby ( Adorno 1973,p.391) : 'What Kant alludes to with respect to freedom would applyt oG od and immortality as well, onlym ores o. Fort hese do not refert oa ny purep ossibility of conduct; their own concepts maket hem postulates of things in being, no matter of what kind. These entities need a "matter",a nd in Kant'sc ase they would depend entirelyupon that visuality whose possibilityheexcludes from the transcendent ideas.The pathos of Kantian intelligibility complements the difficulty of ascertainingi ti na ny way … The concept of the intelligible is not one of ar eality,n or is it ac oncept of something imaginary.I ti sa poretical, rather.' Adorno shares Jacobi'sv iew of the moral theology as representingacrux of the Enlightenment project: see the extended discussion in (Adorno 1973, pp.361-408). ent purposes is that,although of course the practical postulates qualifybyKant's official lights as cognitions, the Kantian conception of apractical cognition does not allow ac onfident answer to be givent ot he question whether or not the objective reality of practical cognitions as they figure in the moral theology, involves the samer obust degree of reality as theoretical reason is able to secure for empirical objects and to think for thingsi nt hemselves. And this indeterminacy derivesf rom two sources, correspondingt oe ach of the criticisms levelled against the moral theology: from theirb eing grounded in practical reason, and so doubtfullycapable of truth; and from theirbeing products of autonomous self-relatingr eason, and so doubtfullyc apable of objective reference.
On Jacobi'sa ccount,K ant'sp ostulatest hus represent an unhappy compromise between recognition of the unshakeable character of the root convictions of naturalc onsciousness,a nd commitment to the necessityofp roof and consequentlytothe principle which identifiescognition with construction (and which, per Jacobi, strips them of ontologicalcommitment). One does not need to accept Jacobi'sf ull diagnosis,h owever,i no rder to concur with his assessment of Kant as operatingw ith two models which are in tension with one another: first,o f practical reason in its pure form as a higher form of cognition,w hich grasps the supersensible with full ontologicali mport;³⁷ and second, of practical reason in the narrow,p lains ense of ap ower directed to producing actions.
The ambiguity thatw ee ncounter when we attempt to gett he practical postulates into focus -when we try to work out exactlywhat they commit us to, and what entitlementst ok nowledge they provide us with -bears ac lose resemblance, which is certainlyn ot accidental, to the peculiard uck/rabbit effect that Jacobi famouslyd iscovered in transcendental idealism: Just as reflection on transcendental idealism from its inside,whereempirical reality seems secure, leads us out to as tandpoint from which the doctrine appears, on the contrary, ontologicallyn ihilistic, so similarlyt he standpoint from which the moral proofs appear effective givesw ay to as tandpoint from which they appear to have gained nothing for practical reason.
 And which even, like Jacobi's Glaube,enjoysadegree of immediacy, in so far as Kant'sjustifications of the postulates arei ntended not as deductions but merelyf or the defenceo fa ntecedentlyf ormed convictions,s pontaneouslyg enerated by the moral disposition.
3T he systematic connection 3.1 Kant'sa ugmented sense of ap racticalp ostulate Now Iwant to try to state the systematic connection in the terms that Ipromised at the outset.
The concept of ap ostulate as it emergesf rom Kant'sm oral theologyi sa n augmented conception, which needs to be distinguished from the generic sense of postulate derivedf rom Aristotle via Euclid. The generic sense -which is the sense that Kant intends in the Postulateso fE mpirical Thought chapter of the first Critique -is that of ap roposition advanced without proof,w hich we are invited to accept on the basis thatn othing speaks against it,a nd that it promises to lead to resultsw hich will recommend the proposition to us.³⁸ Kant's augmented conception of ap ractical postulate incorporates this meaning but has additional, weightier features.I tc omprises, first,arationally necessary cognition possessing ad istinctive kind of ap riori warrant,w hich is neither that of aKantian deduction nor that of the Kantian Faktum der Vernunft, but which emergesu niquelyf rom the practical point of view,w hen (and only when) it reflects on and attempts to coordinate itself with theoretical reason, i. e., when it broaches the standpoint of reason as aw hole. Second, it occupies an intermediate,bridging position in relation to theoretical and practical reason, and on account of this dual citizenship, expresses the unity of Freedomand Nature in am anner which sets it apart from other claims in the Critical system. Third, the practical postulates supply ideas of reason with objective reality,f urnishing end-pointsw hich fulfil, rather than boundaries which restrict,h uman reason: the theological postulates represent the ground of realization of the highestg ood, which is the highest idea of practical reason, and they restore to our cognitive stock the Ideal of Pure Reason, the highest idea of speculative reason. They comprise therefore the points in the Critical system wherei tc omes closest to satisfying the Principle of Sufficient Reason.³⁹  The helpful definition from the Philosophisches Wörterbuch (Schmidt1974, p. 521), is quoted in (Wallner 1985, p. 297n10) : '… ademand, an assumption necessitated by material or logico-intuitive (denkerische)r easons; lacks strict "proof",b ut must be posited and made plausible on the basis of facts or for systematico rp ractical considerations'.  Whether and to what extent theoretical reason'sconcept of God is redeemed is considered by Kant in SectionV II of the Dialectico fP ureP ractical Reason, (Kant 1996 [AA5 :137-141] ). Here Kant affirms that,n otwithstandingt he impossibility of anyi ncrease in our theoretical knowledge of God by wayofpractical cognition, the HighestGood allows for -because it presupposes an omniscient,a ll-beneficent,o mnipotent being -the determinatet houghto fas upersensible It is in consequenceofthese features thatthe practical postulates exhibit the ontological ambiguity which so exercises Jacobi. There are in Kant two vying construals of what it is to be ap ractical postulate. On the one hand, ap ractical postulate is grasped in terms of its objectivereferent,anextra-subjective state of affairs specified by the content of at rue judgement -ap ractical postulate is a claim about howt hings are. On the other hand,p ractical postulates have the character of self-directed acts, commitments,o rundertakings,i nv irtue of which no object (over and abovet he act itself)isi np lay -apractical postulate is something that an agent does. The intended fusion, but actual collision, of these two construals is manifest when Kant writes that the morallyu pright man "mayw ell say: I will that there be aG od, that my existencei nt his world be also an existencei napure world of the understanding … that my duration be endless" (Kant 1996 [AA5 :143] ). The emphasis on the first-person practical standpoint,and the continuity of believing with moral doing,⁴⁰ mayseem to shelter Kant from the charge thatp ractical cognition of the supersensible violates Critical strictures on transcendent metaphysical knowledge,b ut at the same time it impliesanidentification of postulation with mere intra-subjective manipulationo fr epresentations, "belief-states",w ith an exclusively practical end in view,m aking "honest,wholehearted confidence" in theirt ruth impossible. (Kant 1996 [AA5 :139 -140] ). If this leavesitu ncertain whether all elements of the speculative concept of God including that of ens realissimum are in playand have been underwritten,the Canon of PureReason in the first Critique leavesn od oubt concerning the objective reality of reason'st ranscendental Ideal and idea of an ecessary being: see (A814-816/B842-844), where Kant says that the moral order leads to the conception of naturea sas ystemo fe nds originatingf roma ni dea, and hencet o a' transcendental theology -atheology which takes the ideal of supreme ontologicalperfection … the absolutenecessity of one primordial being'.The speculativeconcept of God is, therefore, validated( subject to all of Kant'su sual qualifications) by means of the practical postulates.  In this light it maybesaid that the mere propositions that God exists and that Ihaveanimmortal soul (not even, qua their logical connections with objects of purep ractical reason)a re not postulates, but become so onlya sa nd when I do something, viz., postulatet heir objects in consequenceo fm ym oral will. 1912). Another response, which defines the GermanI dealist reception of Kant's moral theology, is to take the concept of apractical postulate as specifying a target -in other words, to view Kant as having at least identified what needs to be provided. On this account,Kant is to be regarded as exactlyright about the postulates to the extent thathesupposes claims of such asort to be necessary for a system of Critical philosophy, but as having failed to show that and how Critical philosophym akes them possible. On this view,t he Kantian system has overreached itself in the moralt heology, yeth as done so with all justification. The concept of ap ractical postulate would thus represent for progressive post-Kantians ap roblem to be solved, and which is to be solvedb ym ore idealismr ather than less. The value of Kant'sp ractical postulatesf or German Idealism consists accordinglyn ot in their provision of anyp hilosophical doctrineb ut in theirgiving a forward-looking definition to the problems of Kantianism -they project the kind of philosophical move required in order for those problems to be resolved.
Such as trategycan be held to to take full account of the criticisms levelled by Kant'scritics, while drawinganopposed conclusion. AccordingtoJ acobi and others taking the side of Glaube,t he hopelesslyc ompromised, ersatz faith offered by Kant'sr ational religion displays in gross form the futility of the Copernican endeavour to make the subject the ground of all normative claims. At the other extreme, accordingtoKant'srationalist critics, if the moral theologyworks, then it can onlybebecause it shows the unavoidable necessity of confidencei n the spontaneous products of pure reason; so it leads us back to wherew ew ere before the Copernican revolution.⁴¹ On the GermanI dealist construal, both of these outcomes can be avoided by redeveloping -by,a sS chellingp uts it,b y an intensification of -the concept of practical postulation. On this account,practical postulates represent what might be called background, or second-level, transcendental conditions, extrapolated from the front-line conditions of possibility of objects, the conditions which figure in the conclusionsoftranscendental proofs and which constitutet he objects which they condition. Practical postulates -or what began as such in the Kantian system -would accordingly comprise conditions of the conditions which directlym ake objects (theoretical and practical) possible. They would satisfy Critical strictures and retain ac laim to being properlyt ranscendental, while having potentiallyt he same reach as the intuitions of reason to which earlym odernr ationalism laid claim: they would comprise, as it were, pure reason rehabilitated, purgedo fd ogmatic contamination. The postulate strategy thus holds out the promise -alreadyi ntimated in  This is the implication of Johann August Eberhard'sc ritique of Kantian philosophy -see (Eberhard1 793a nd 1799) -and, in ad ifferent way, of Maimon's.
Kant'sc laim for a "practico-dogmatic metaphysics"-of recouping, on properly Critical grounds,t he sphere of speculative metaphysics.
This claim of logical continuity is supported if we look at Kant'se ssay, "What Does it Mean to Orientate Oneself in Thinking?" (1786) (Kant 1996b [AA 8:137-139] ).H ereK ant is trying to walk as traight path between Jacobi's Glaube and the dogmatic rationalism of Mendelssohn, in the context of the Pantheismusstreit.K ant is required accordinglyt os how thatt he Critical philosophyd elivers claims regardingthe supersensible which are more thannotionally distinct from those of dogmatic metaphysics,yet at the samet ime sufficientlyr obust to satisfy atheist.Tothis end Kant refers to,asheputs it, "the right of reason's need [das Recht des Bedürfnisses der Vernunft]",wherehemeans reason in general,as opposed to simplythe rights and needs of practical reason. AndKant affirms that the notion of aright based on aneed extends to speculative reason as well:⁴² theoretical reason has, Kant says,alegitimate need to take the existence of an original and highestb eing as the ground of all possibility;r eason needs not just to "taket he concept" of an unlimited being as the ground of the possibility of all things, but to presuppose "its existence"-" so geht dieses Bedürfniß auch auf die Voraussetzungdes Daseins desselben"-and to do so in the mode of holding it true, Fürwahrhalten (Kant 1996b[AA 8:137-138] ).⁴³ This existential assumption goes beyond, Kant again makes clear,t he mere regulative use of reason.⁴⁴ But, Kant adds immediately, the necessity here is merely "subjective" and yields "onlyanecessary presupposition",since, he reminds us, a need of reason should not be mistaken for an insight (that beingthe mistake of the dogmatic rationalist) (Kant 1996b, [AA8 :138n] ).
This of course recalls the acute difficulty pinpointed by Jacobi -what can it mean to talk of an ecessary presupposition incorporating an ontological claim and possessingtruth, which is nonetheless to be regarded as merely subjective? -but the key, new point which has come to light here is Kant'sr ecognition that there is need for something,s ome principle, to lie behind practical reason. Such ap rinciple could not derive its authority from the moral fact of reason, but would instead provide ag eneral principle of warrant for taking reason to have at least potential ontological significance,and the principle of the primacy  The passagesi nq uestion area t ( Kant 1996b [AA8 :137-139] (Kant 1996b [AA8 :136 -137] ), and it does not require that the right of reason'sn eed be invoked. of practical reason would be onlyaspecial form of this principle.⁴⁵ In this light, the Fichte-Schelling construal of ah ighest postulate -to which Iw ill now return -represents the next step thatn eeds to be taken, if the Kantian theory of the rights of reason is to be differentiated from that of the dogmatic rationalist, and to meet Jacobi'so bjection that it results in mere fictions.
2. Fichte. The augmented sense of practical postulate matches what we saw in the 1804 Wissenschaftslehre, whereFichteaffirmedanultimatepoint of identity between ontology and normativity,apoint wherebeing is grasped as Sollen, which reflection on empiricallyd etermined consciousness cannot attest to the reality of, and which thereforec annot be legitimateda safront-line condition of possibilityo fo bjects,⁴⁶ but which we are bound to presuppose in its background, as an "upstream" or second-level transcendental condition. The crux of this argument,w es aw,l ies in the idea of an imperative or practical judgement,aSollen,t hat testifies to the reality of (byc ontaining insight into) its own presupposed, theoretically conceivedg round: which represents exactly the targetd efined by Kant'se mploymenti nt he moral theologyo ft he concept of ap ractical postulate.⁴⁷ So the Wissenschaftslehre can be held to have done what Kant showed needs to be done for the sake of the moraltheology, but failed to actually do,and it has moreover taken up the problems of the moraltheology in ageneralizedform, yielding a general solution to the problem of transcendental proof. As Fichteputs it,in1804 (Fichte2005), what we have graspedisthat in the case at hand "the bare possibility of this presupposition shows its truth and correctness" (Fichte 2005 what ought to be' or 'apossible free action',but rather 'what is')but not 'speculative' (because imperativesc an be 'derivedf romt hem').  We began with 'amere presupposition,groundingthe process of our proof regarding the essenceofthe absolute, but itself based on nothing',but 'this presuppositionprovesits correctness simplyb yi ts merep ossibilitya nd facticity' (Fichte 2005,p The 1804 Wissenschaftslehre, Isuggest,r esolves the ambiguitiesofthe Jena Wissenschaftslehre, which, we can now see, werei nherited directlyf rom Kant: Fichte'sd ifficulty in determining whether or not the absolutes elf has being,o r is merelya nidea,t he projected object of our striving,r eproduces the difficulty that Kant'sc ritics identified in determiningw hether or not the theological postulates can be thought to have objective reality.⁴⁹ 3. Schelling. Again, Kant'sa ugmented sense of postulate is continuous with what we find in Schelling in the writingsIdiscussed earlier,and also, even more clearly, in his Philosophische Briefe,written slightlye arlier than the Abhandlungen.
This text consists of ac ritical response to Kant'sm oral theologya nd am ediation of Kant and Spinoza.⁵⁰ The two tasksa re intimatelyc onnected. The mediation of Kant and Spinoza requires abovea ll, on Schelling'sa ccount,that we understand the distinctiono fc riticism from dogmatism correctly. Andf or two reasons he choosesK ant'sm oral theologya st he territory on which to pursue  This bears on the issue explored in (Ameriks 2000) . In so far as Fichtei sc onstrued as pursuingaglobal strategyo fa ttemptingt ov indicatee pistemological propositions on moral grounds by extendingd rasticallyt he scope of the principle of the primacyo fp ractical reason, the foundation of which lies in the fact of purepractical reason,itisright to wonder if the Faktum der Vernunft can bear the considerable burden imposed upon it.Ifitcannot,then it must be concluded that the Wissenschaftslehrereproduces the weaknesses of Kant'smoral theology on a largerscale -which was in fact just the complaint of Schellingafter his break with Fichte,and of Hegel( as discussed below;s ee notes9 3a nd 94). Whether or not this is ac orrect estimateo f Fichte'sJ ena position, it is clear that in the 1804 Wissenschaftslehre, at least,h ed oes not lean on the principle of the primacyo fp ractical reasona sK ant left it: hereF ichtea ims to solve the problems surroundingt he idea that practical reason has authority for theoretical reflection, which he perceivesa sb ound up with general problems attendingt he transcendental method. Providingsome evidencethat Fichte had takent he lesson of Kant'scritics and was attuned from the very outset to the problems attendingpractical foundationalism -whether or not the Jena Wissenschaftslehremade agood job of it -see the openingof'Praktische Philosophie' (Fichte1 971b, [FW/GA: II, III, [181] [182] ),a nd (Breazeale 2004,p p. 67-68) , suggestingt hat the Wissenschaftslehreb ev iewed as ar esponse to the manifest strain of practical postulation, as revealed in Fichte's Kritik aller Offenbarung.  As noted earlier,Schelling was exposed to argument concerningthe relation of Kantian philosophyt oChristian belief at the TübingenS tift.H enrich 1997a rgues for the keyr oleo fI mmanuel Diez in articulatingdissatisfaction, on 'radical Kantian' grounds,with the attempts of Storr and his school at an accommodation of Kant'sphilosophywith Christian orthodoxy. Schelling's abreaction to Christianized Kantianism is evidenced in his letter to Hegel, 6J anuary 1795; i n (Frank/Kurz 1975,p p. 117-120) . The PhilosophischeB riefe ared oubtless targeteda bovea ll against the Christian appropriation of Kant,but the scopeofSchelling'sdiscussion goes far beyond whati sr equiredt oc hallenge claims for the agreement of Kantianism with revealed religion.
this aim: first because it is the part of Kant'ss ystem which has been most conspicuouslyp erverted by religious conservatives, who have misunderstood the distinction of criticism from dogmatism; and second because it is, at the same time, the part of the system in which the spirit of Kantianism comes closest to receiving open expression.
Schellingpresents accordinglyadetailed critique of the moral theology,the upshoto fw hich, however,i sn ot abandonment of practical postulation, but its reinstatement,inthe form of absolute cognition grounded on freedom -which is the real ground of criticism'sdistinction from dogmatism, and the true respect in which criticism represents aphilosophicallyhigher position. Schellingdescribes the two systems as distinguishedb yt he different spirit of their practical postulates,freedom supplying thatofcritical postulates (Schelling1980b, p. 190 [SW: I, 333] ). Kant'st heism having been disposed of, practical postulation is re-associated with the anti-theismofSpinoza, whose realism it absorbs,counter-balancing Kantian idealism.⁵¹ And it is alsoassociated by Schelling with tragedy: in an anticipation of the general view of art taken in the 1800 System (Schelling 1978) , Schellingd escribes the state of mind of the tragic protagonist,which tragic art allows us to enter into, as aunification of opposites -of man vs. world, subject vs. "absolute object",f reedom vs. necessity, and so on. Tragedyi st hus an alternative form which philosophy'sabsolute postulate, or intellectual intuition, may take (Schelling1 980b,p .157 [SW: I, 285] ).
The argument of Schelling's Philosophische Briefe centres on his repudiation of the, as he sees it,pseudo-Kantian strategyofp ositing a weakened theoretical reason, the "system of weak reason" (Schelling1 980b,p .1 61 [SW: I, 290] ).⁵² In addition to generatingt he paradoxese xposed by Jacobi and other Kantians (Schelling1 980b, p p. 159 and 191n [SW: I, nd 333n]),⁵³ the strategy makes no sense since, once an ew field of cognitionh as been opened up by  In an elevated form, of course, that goes beyond the naively dogmatic.  The view of the relation of theoretical and practical reason takenhereisexplained earlier in VomI ch. Here Schellingo bserves that 'Kant'st heoretical philosophyi sn ot connected with the practical by ac ommon principle.H is practical philosophyd oes not seem to be one-and-thesame structurew ith the theoretical; instead it seems to be am erea nnex to his philosophya s aw hole and, what is more, an annex wide open to attacks fromt he main building' (Schelling 1980,p p. 65 -66 [SW: I, 154] ). The remedyf or this disunity is to translatet he practical back into the theoretical, by graspingthat practical cognition is non-objectual: 'To be sure, according to Kant,practical philosophyleads intothe supersensuous domain because, in its turn, it annihilates everythingt hat is theoretical and reestablishes whati si ntuited intellectually …' (Schelling 1980,p p. 99 -100 [SW: I, 201-202) .  Conclusions cannot be drawn frommereneeds,and if they aredrawn, then they requiretheoretical support (Schelling1 980b, p. 158 [SW: I, [286] [287] ).
an "intensified [verstärkten]" practical reason, theoretical reason has every right to take possession of what has been discovered; indeed, theoretical reason may be regarded as itself transformed by intensified practical cognition (Schelling 1980b,p p. 158 -159 [SW: I, 287] ). Moreover,t he "system of weak reason" fails to refute dogmatism, but merelyd emonstrates its indemonstrability (Schelling 1980b,p .1 64 [SW: I, 295] ), leaving dogmatism sufficientlyi ntactt ot hreaten to destroy the practical foundations of the moral theology.⁵⁴ Whati sn eeded is a conclusive,p riorv ictory over dogmatism in the theoretical sphere, and this demands thatweproceed to ahigher point than thatofthe Critique of Pure Reason. In short, the moral theologyd emands that we re-engagew ith questions in theoretical philosophy -in fact,with the highest question of all, that of the existenceo ft he world, the egress of finite beingsf rom the absolute (Schelling 1980b,p p. 164,1 74,1 77 [SW: I, 294,3 10,3 13 -314] ),⁵⁵ which subsumes the lower-level questions of the relation of subject and object,and of the possibility of experience.B ut it also tells us how those questions should be addressed, namelyt hrough af urther augmentation of the concept of ap ractical postulate, which we should now conceive as a "productive realization" on the part of the practical faculty,b yw hich the system of freedom obtains reality (Schelling 1980b,p.171 [SW: I, 305] ): "the theoretical question necessarilybecomes apractical postulate" (Schelling1 980b,p .1 75 [SW: I, 311] ).⁵⁶ And this practical postulate also represents,S chelling claims, Spinoza'st rue (albeit inadequatelye xpressed) insight.⁵⁷  A 'breath of dogmatism would overthrow your house of cards': (Schelling 1980b, p. 161[SW: I, 290] ).  As an assertion of the absolute in human knowledge,itis'groundless' and 'can have no further ground' (Schelling1 980b, p. 173 [ SW:I , 3 08] ).  Schellingadds an explanation for whyreasonshould appear weak: the 'absolute freedom in you … makes the intellectual world inaccessible to every objective power ' (Schelling1 980b, p. 195 [SW: I, 340] ).  Spinoza framed his insight,S chellingc laims,i nt erms of merelya nalytic propositions: (Schelling1 980b, 178, 181 [SW: I, (309) (310) 3 15, 3 19] ).
The critique of Kant'smoral theology in this text has manyelements.Ihave referred already to (1) the alleged incoherenceofthe moral theology regarding truth and practical reason,and (2) the allegedlym isguided strategyo fw eakening theoretical reason.S chelling'sv iew is that the relevantp roperties of cognitive strength -capacity or incapacity to grasp the supersensiblecannot be localized to particular 'forms' of reason: if practical reasonc an grasp the supersensible, then this must be true of theoretical reason as well; practical reason testifies to theoretical reason'scapacity to do the same. If the concept of God is not theoreticallylegitimate, then practical reason is not entitled to employ it (Schelling1 980b, p. 158 [SW: I, 286] ). But several other importantchargesare also laid: (3) To the extent that the moral theology allows itself to be appropriated by dogmatism, this is because it is grounded on what has been conceived in abstract 4. The favourable and unfavourable treatments of practical postulation that we find in the German Idealists can be regarded as two sides of the same coin. If we look at the series of German Idealist treatments of Kant'sm oral theologythe list of writingsIgave at the beginning -we see ap rogressive reversal of estimate concerningits value. At the outset,in1792, Fichteendorses the moral theologyand extends the scope of the practical postulates that emerge from the antinomyo fp ractical reason to include revelation and transcendental idealism itself. At about the same time Hegel subscribes to the moraltheologyasaframework for developing his thoughts about religion, morality,a nd their regeneration. Later Schelling criticizes the detail of Kant'sm oral theology, dismissing Kant'sa ntinomyofp ractical reason and the theisticr esolution thereof, but proposes an overhauled, Spinozistic version which he claims captures its true spirit. Finally, in the Phenomenology,H egel declares it a "whole nest" of "thoughtless contradictions" (Hegel 1977a, §617,p .3 74 [HW:I II, 452] ).⁵⁸ On the account I terms as amere method,which as such (like all methods) is necessarily neutral between dogmatism and criticism. The merely methodological conception of practical postulationw hich is deployed in the moral theology is thus inadequate( see note 124b elow). (4) The moral theology is ethicallyl imited and aesthetically null. To posit a 'moral god',aG od 'under moral laws',i n order to guarantee our indestructibility,istoannihilate the possibilityofthe sublime; sublimity belongs to tragedy, which allows that we mayperish in the struggle with 'the immeasurable'.The positingofamoral god 'keepsthe world within bounds',and interposes somethingbetween the world and myself, with the resultthat my intuition of the world is 'restricted',and that the 'abandonment' of myself to the world which marks tragedy -our confrontation with 'the immeasurable'-becomes impossible.Nor is the moral theology compatible with beauty,the proper principle of which is 'reciprocal yieldingi nc ontest',a gaint he prerogative of tragedy. Moral theism thus has no 'aesthetic side':itnegates the possibilityofaesthetic value (Schelling1980b, p. 157 [SW: I, [284] [285] ). (5) The moralized conception of God is in anycase destroyed oncewe, having achieved practical cognition of God, reflect on what God'sr eality involves, namely, the transmoral reality of Spinoza'sGod sive Nature. Thus Schelling talks of destroyingthe moral theology onceweretrace our steps (Schelling1980b, p. 160 [SW: I, 289] ). (6) The highest good, conceived as 'rewarding happiness',i sa' moral delusion',a ni ncoherent 'assignat' (Schelling1 980b, pp. 183 -184 [SW: I, [322] [323] ). Properlyi nterpreted, the highestg ood is ab eatitude identical with absolute freedom (Schelling1 980b, pp. 184-185a nd 187-188 [SW: I, 324a nd 328 -329]).
Specific criticism of Kant'st heological postulates is also contained in VomI ch (Schelling 1980,p p. 96 -97 [SW: I, 197-198] ), in Abhandlungen (Schelling1 994,p p. 137-138 [SW: I, [451] [452] ), whereS chelling claims that Kant'sc laims concerningG od and immortality fail to qualify as postulates, and in (Schelling1 927-59), which refers scathinglyt oK antians whor eintroduce by the back door of philosophyw hat has been expelled from the front,a nd again insists that deemingac oncept ap ractical postulatec annot circumvent the theoretical question 'nach dem letzten Grund der Realität' (Schelling1 980b, SW:I ,4 76).  Restated in the Encyclopedia Logic, §60 (Hegel 1975,p p. 90 -91 [HW:VIII, 141-142] ).
have suggested, this maybeseen as amatter of using,and finallykicking away,a philosophical ladder: once everything necessary had been extracted from Kant's moral theology, there remained nothing to sayabout Kant'sp ractical postulates beyond indicating how they fall shortofthe desiderata of systematic unification which they themselvesimplied, and which the new post-Kantian idealismclaimed to meet.
This conception of the moraltheologyasdefining the conditions of adequacy for post-Kantian idealismi sr eflected in the wayt hat it recurs in the internecine strife of GermanI dealism. Schellinga nd Hegel, in the Differenzschrift of 1801 and Kritisches Journal essays of 1802 ( Schelling 2000,p p. 371-374[ SW:V , 112-117] ),⁵⁹ deploy against Fichteo bjections which follow closelyt he pattern of those thathad been put adecade previouslytoKant'smoral theology -Fichtean idealismi s, in effect,chargedw ith reproducingi ts incoherences in magnified form.⁶⁰ The theme returns in the late Schelling'sH egel critique: Hegel's "pure-rational" philosophy, Schellingm aintains, grinds to ah alt at exactlyt he same point as Kant'sp ostulate of God'se xistence, that is, before the transition has been made from mere ideation to actual existence.⁶¹ 6. To recapitulate, and to return to the material discussed in the first part of this paper,wecan see how,under pressurefrom the two objections to the moral  The charge that Fichte'si dealism reproducest he limitationso fK ant'sp hilosophya sd isplayedi nt he moral theology is made in (Schelling1 984,p .2 2[ SW:I V, 326]), and (Schelling 1988, p. 54 [SW: II, 72] ): the validity of subject-object identity is restrictedbyFichte to subjective consciousness,a nd the absolutei sr educed to the mere 'object of an endless task,a na bsolute demand';F ichte,l ike Kant,e xcludes absoluteness from speculation and seeks to reconnect it with the deepest subjectivity onlyt hrough action and faith; Schellingr eferst op assagesi n the Grundlage where Fichte identifies absolute unity with the object of an Idea understood merely as 'something that ought to exist'.  Schelling, lettert oF ichte,3October1 801 (Frank/Kurz 1975,p.162) : 'in order to upholdy our system,one must decide at the outset to proceed fromSeeing [Sehen] and to have no moretodo with the Absolute (the trulys peculative), roughly in the wayt hat,i nK antian philosophy, the moral lawm ust come first and God last,i ft he system is to hold up' (myt ranslation).  In passagesf romt he late Philosophy of Revelation,S chellingr eturns to Kant'sp ostulateo f God'se xistence. This he now interprets as a demand 'for an extension' of philosophyw hich Kant was unable to follow through:l ackinga ny concept of theoretical philosophyt hat is not that of a 'mere scienceo fr eason',S chellings ays, Kant was forcedt oc onceptualize it as ad emand that 'onlyh ad significancef or action [die Praxis]',whereas its true and proper fulfilment lies in 'positive philosophy ' (Schelling2 007, p. 191 [SW: XIII, 146] ). Schellingd irects this same point against Hegel, whose 'rational', 'pure-rational' philosophyr eproducest he limitations of asubjectivemoral need ('subjektive oder moralische Notwendigkeit')which demands the reality of God in af orm (namely: as 'das Überseiende')w hich it cannot accommodate( Schelling1 977, p. 135). theology, Kant'sp roblematic notion of practical postulation evolvesi nGerman Idealism in three stages: (i) In Fichte'sJ ena Wissenschaftslehre, the concept of ap ostulate remains practical in Kant'ssense of invoking the principle of the primacy of practical reason, but it is, crucially, disconnected from the highest good and antinomyo f practical reason analyzed in Kant'ss econd Critique. This is shownb yt he way in which, we saw, Fichtei nt he Wissenschaftslehre novam ethodo identifies what he calls "Kant'sp ostulate"-in the singular -not with anyp roposition or doctrine sanctioned by the principle of the primacyo fp ure practical reason, but with that principle itself.
(ii) Then, in the movef rom the Jena to the 1804 Wissenschaftslehre, postulation remains thought through and as Sollen,but the subject of obligation -that which soll -is no longer the Ich,but being -the absolute -itself. The Sollen in application to the absolutenolonger has adeterminatelymoral character.Fichte thereby bringsh imself partiallyi nto line with Schelling, but remains separated from him by his insistencet hat Sollen provides the exclusive routet o, and is equiprimordial with, absolute Seyn.
(iii) In Schelling'sc onception, the Sollen is side-lined, in so far as it is adduced merelyinorder to provide the basisonwhich we are entitled to postulate the universal validity of our intellectual intuition. This might seem to make Schelling'snotion of postulation theoretical rather than practical, but he continues to affirm also its intrinsic practical significance, and this is readilyi ntelligible, since it is for Schelling an expression -and not a representation -of freedom: Schelling'sa bsolutep ostulate supplies the immediate ground of moral consciousness, which it therefore implicates.
Ther esulting notion,w hether we take Fichte'sv ersion or Schelling's, preserves allt hree of theo riginalK antian features -rationallyn ecessary cognition, whichreflectsthe standpoint of reason as awhole,and realizes itshighest ideaswith thed ifferences that,because postulationh as been released from itss ubservience to theh ighestg ood, thef irsto bjection is disarmed -philosophy'sp ostulatesare conceptuallya utonomous, noti nstrumental -andthe ontological ambiguityh as been removed -thee xistential commitment is unequivocal.
Fichtea nd Schelling'sp ositions, as they stand at the end of this development,c an of course be stated without reference to Kant'sm oral theology, but this eventual conceptual independence does not detract from the fact that the development and formulationo ft he notion of absolute postulation was undertaken in light of their perception of the philosophical potential of Kant'spractical postulates.I fwewant to locate the point whereGerman Idealism comes closest to explicitlya cknowledging this debt,while at the same time affirming the selfsufficiency of the newlydeveloped notion and its ultimateconceptual independ-ence from its Kantian ancestor,then the place to look is Hegel's Differenz essay and Glauben und Wissen.⁶²
4C ontrasting post-Kantian developments
In order to throw into relief the distinctive wayi nw hich Fichtea nd Schelling pursue Kant'sc onception of practical postulation, we mayc ontrastt heir treatments of the practical postulatesa nd moralt heologyw ith thoseo ft hreeo ther post-Kantians, namely Jakob Sigismund Beck, Jakob Friedrich Fries, and Novalis.
 See the account of Kantian faith as reflection'srelation to the Absolute (Hegel 1977b, p. 100 [HW:I I, 31-32] , and (Hegel 1977,pp. 94-96,156,178,187 [HW:I I, 329 -332, 395 -396,418 -419, 428 -429] ) -moral faith is recognized as the highest point reached in the Kantian system, the point wherei tc omes closest to the Absolute. This assessment endured: in al ettert oD uboc, 30 July 1822, Hegelw rites: 'However,b esides the other merits of the Kantian philosophy, I still wish to point out how interestinga nd instructive it is to see in Kant'ss o-called postulates not onlyt he necessity of the Idea but also the morep recise definition of it' (Hegel 1984 ,p.492 [Briefe,Bd. II, 1813 -1822 ). In the 'Postulates of Reason' section of the Differenzschrift (Hegel 1977b, pp. 111-112 [HW:II, 42 -44] ), which follows the discussion of transcendental intuition, Hegele xhibits ac omplex ambivalencer egarding the concept of ap ostulate: the Idea itself cannot be postulated, but its intuitional complement is postulated by Reason, yetn ot in opposition to the Idea, though 'this whole manner of postulating' is also, viewed from another angle, merelyd ue to the fact that one-sided reflection has been taken as as tartingp oint,t he effect of which is distorting,s incer eason thereby appears 'needy'.T he upshot,Isuggest,i s that when Hegeld escribesR eason, liberated fromr eflection, as 'positinga bsoluteness', 'both Ideaa nd Being',h em ight just as wellh avec alled it an absolutep ostulate. It is noteworthy, in this connection, that in the Lecturesonthe PhilosophyofReligion Hegelaffirms that religious consciousness proceeds, as Kant and Fichtem aintain,v ia the necessity of a presupposition, while insistingt hat this presupposition is not merely subjective;i ts appearance as merely 'the activity and so forth' of the subjecti so nlyo ne 'moment' (Hegel 1824, pp. 212-214[ HW:X VII, 269 -270] ).
Hegel'sp osition in these texts, from1 801 and 1802, is related to the intellectual development exhibited in the Jugendschriften in the followingway:Inthe course of the 1790s, after initiallyaffirmingthe unqualified adequacyofKant'smoral theology in the 1793 Tübingenessayon religion (Hegel 2002) , Hegeld iscovers the problem (as he perceivesit) that Kant is stuck with a flat opposition of OughttoIs. This problem is made explicit in the later Spirit of Christianity text (Hegel 1996) , but at this point Hegeleither does not perceive it as adeep metaphysical problem in its full generality or is without the means to address it.S chelling'si dentity philosophyp rovides Hegelw ith this means,a llowingh im in the 1801-02 essays to reject the moral theology from as tandpointt hat has surpassed it.
Beck
Beck'sp roposal is that Kant'st heory of empirical knowledge be construed as a theoryofpostulates,and even more fundamentally, that the very transcendental Standpunct of Critical philosophyi tself be regarded as defined by and around a single postulate, of what he calls "original representing", ursprüngliche Vorstellen. On Beck'saccount,the application of the categories -in for example the subject-predicate synthesis, whereby something permanentisposited as underlying the empirical manifold -presupposes (indeed, consists in) an "activity [Handlung]ofobjective relation", "originalattribution [ursprüngliche Beilegung]", "original procedure( or use) of the understanding [ursprüngliche Verstandesverfahren]".T his activity,w hereby the category of for example substance is given application, is one that, we discover, must be performed if we are to satisfy the imperative "Conceive of being presented with an object!" or "Producet he synthetic unity of consciousness!" or "Represent originally!"⁶³ The categories are thus reconstrued as determinatefunctions realized in acts, as modes of Vorstellen as opposed to Vorstellungen,our consciousness of which is what givesour representations objective reference (and at the same time generates the "Ithink" of the objective synthetic unity of apperception). By treating application of the categories on the model of ag eometer'sa cts of mental imagingi nc ompliance with postulates,Beck aims to give transcendental claims the samedegree of certainty and perspicuity.
Beck'searlyletters to Kant suggest that he was motivated originallytodevelop this theory by the difficulties that he considered created by Kant'sd efinition of intuition in terms of "immediate relation to an object",which, Beck supposes, contradictst he Transcendental Deduction'sc laim that the categories are necessary for objectivity.⁶⁴ Beck'sf ull view,however,which he develops in two books in 1796,⁶⁵ is that recognition of an original use of the understanding in "original representing" is strictlyr equired for ac orrect understanding of all coreK antian notions -includingt he absolutelyb asic notion of "the possibilityo fe xperience",asCritical philosophyunderstandsit-and that without it Kantianism becomes dogmatic. Dogmatic Kantianism is what results when transcendental phi- 'Stelle ursprünglichv or!', ( Beck 1796b, §9) . These area lternative but according to Beck equivalent formulations of the Postulat.  And not in the first instance, although this comes immediatelytothe fore, the problem of the thingi ni tself.  Expounded in (Beck 1796a) and (Beck 1796b) and neatlysummarized in his letters to (Kant: 17 June 1794,n o. 630, [AA1 1:509 -511] ) (Kant 1999,p p. 479 -480), and (20J une 1797,n o. 754, 12:164-169) (Kant 1999,p p. 512-515). losophyisconstrued as amatter of discursive proof-giving,amethodologywhich is futile -since it leavesuswith mere shells of philosophicalconcepts, to which no real sense or meaning attaches -and which provokes an ew skepticism (which it is unable to answer). The presentation of the theory of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason follows ad ogmatic route, Beck allows, but it does so onlyf or heuristicp urposes, in letterb ut not in spirit; Kant was obliged to begin within his readers'" dogmatic casto fm ind",i no rder to lead them out of it (Beck 1796b, §71) .
Though his owni ntentions werel imited to overhaulingt he exposition of Kant'st heoretical philosophyw ithout anya lteration of its teachings,w ith a view to renderingi tc onsistent and immune to skeptical attack,B eck'st heory of ap ostulate of original representing departs from Kant in important,i ndeed, proto-Fichtean ways.⁶⁶ But while in some set of terms Beck'st heory counts as aradical innovation, his employment of the concept of apostulateg oes beyond that of Kant in the Postulateso fE mpirical Thought in onlyalimited respect. Kant claims in the Postulates chapter that the objective application of modal concepts involves ar eflective,s econd-order appraisal of previouslygiven objective cognitions: to saythat an object is possible is to judge thatthe cognition of it is consistent with the principles of possiblee xperience (Beck 1796b, § § 49 -52). Beck preserves this idea: to sayt hat ac ertain category is necessary for experience is to sayt hat the corresponding act must be performed if there is to be objective representation. The key element that Beck adds is the notion that,inorder to undertake such an appraisal, it is necessary to occupy the standpoint of objectrepresentation in a non-discursive,proto-phenomenological sense:Beck talks of the necessity of transposing ourselves ("sich versetzen")into the situation wherein all experience is generated.⁶⁷ In so doing Beck drawsthe Kantian sense of postulate back to its Euclidean root: in place of the mere analogy that Kant implies of the principles which govern the use of modal categories with the postulates of Euclid, Beck envisagesgeometrical cognition as asub-instance of the very same kind of postulate-based cognitionas, on his account,constitutes transcendental philosophical knowledge in general.⁶⁸  Notet hat,w hethero rn ot Beck'sa ccount eliminates sensation and sensibility in Fichtean fashion -the charge levelled by Schulz -and whether or not it improves Kant'ssituation overall, Beck (i) deprivesK ant of his preferredretort to the charge of Berkeleyanism, and (ii) undercuts the non-empiricale mployment of the categories that Kant wishes to preserve.  'Ich … suche meinen Leser in die Handlung selbst zu versetzen';lettertoK ant,17J une 1794, no. 630 ( Kant 1999,p .480 [AA1 1:510) . And see (Beck 1796b, §91) .  '… this production of the syntheticunity of consciousness "the original attribution [ursprün-gliche Beilegung]".I ti st his activity,a mongothers,that the geometer postulates when he starts Beck'snotion of apostulate of original representing is thus clearlydifferent from the notion of practical postulation employed in the moral theology. Indeed it might well be thoughtthat on Beck'sterms there could not be postulates in the sense of the moral theology, since postulation is tied by Beck to an object'sbeing given in the synthetic unity of apperception, and the practical postulates certainly do not give objective reality to ideas of reason in that way. But in fact,a nd surprisingly,t his is not what Beck says.I nstead, Beck drawsu pa na ccount of practical reason in an attempted parallel with his account of theoretical reason, maintaining that there is also apostulate of an "original use" of practical reason, whereby we conceive ourselvesa sn on-natural causes capable of determining our wills independentlyo fa ll natural influence. (Beck 1796b, Part II, § § 208-233) The obvious problem with this strategy -which is forced on Beck by his agreementt of ollow Kant in matters of morality and religion, rather than handing them over to the Glaubensphilosophen -is the absenceo fa ny common feature, beyond the mere title, of the original theoretical and practical postulates: Beck givesn oc lue as to how an original act of the practical faculty can give rise to,o ry ield knowledge of, our existencea se xtra-empirical agents, in the wayt hat an original act of the understandingc an allow objects to be given. If practical postulation parallels theoretical postulation, then freec ausality ought to be phenomenologicallyimmanent -which would convert practical reason into intellectual intuition (as well as undercuttingK ant'si dentification of freedom with morality).⁶⁹ his geometry from the proposition "Conceive of space";a nd no discursiver epresentation whatsoever could takeits placefor this purpose. As Isee the matter,the postulate "To conceive of an object by means of the original attribution" is also the highest principle of philosophya sa whole',B eckt oK ant,1 7J une 1794,n o. 630 ( Kant 1999,p p. 479 -480 [AA1 1:509] ). Notet hat Beck'sc oncept of postulate, as my account has revealed, involves two separable elements: the (single) imperative that defines transcendental reflection and which demands ap re-discursive act (postulates as per Euclid), e. g., 'Represent an object!',which as Beck says (Beck 1796b, §8)c annot be equated with ah ypothesis;a nd the (plural) non-imperatival, theoretical, discursive principles that transcendental reflection leads us to grasp (postulates as per Kant'sP ostulates of Empirical Thought). The latter ared iscussed in some detail in (Beck 1796b, § § 49 -52). The connection of the twos enses is nonetheless clear:p ostulates-as-principles arew hat result from the dissection and exhibition (Beck 1796b, §9) o ft he original use of the understanding which the imperatival postulatec ommands.  The resultismassively revisionary of Kant in several respects.IfBeck is right that extra-natural freedom is involved in practical reason, then it must be epistemicallyp rior to moralityperhaps in agreement with the Groundworko ft he Metaphysics of Morals,P t. III, but contra the Critique of Practical Reason. This indeed seems to be acknowledged, since in (Beck 1796b, §215) , Beck makes the Formula of Universal Lawthe expression of freedom, hence,presumably, epistemicallyd erivedf rom our knowledge of our freedom. Second, if Beck werec orrect,t hen What Beck has specificallyd eclined, with his attempted parallelism of theoretical and practical postulates,isthe distinctiveambition of Kant'snotion of a practical postulate to straddle the twospheres.Itisnoaccident,therefore, that in Beck'so wn exposition of Kant'sm oral theology, no mention is made of postulates,and the distinctive and complex character of Kant'stheological postulates, with all of the problems that surround them, givesw ay to the plain and simple identification of religious belief with hope,oranattitude of mere confidence that one will achieveone'sm oral goal.⁷⁰ Schelling'sc ritique of Beck, in the 1797-98 Abhandlungen (Schelling1994,pp. 112-119 [SW: I, 135] ),⁷¹ accordinglyhighlights and takes issue with the conservative character of Beck'srevision of the concept of ap ostulate, which leavest he operations of the Verstand disjoined from the Ideas of Vernunft,a nd the latter outside the scope of theoretical cognition.
Fries
The interest of Fries in the present context lies in his showing how,while accepting the central thrust of Jacobi'scritique of Kant'smoral theologyand of Critical philosophyingeneral, one might nevertheless attempt to rescue the Kantian system in the service of theistic ends. Fries aims to broker areconciliation between prima facie we would have cognition of ourselvesasintelligible causes, and this would count as apieceoftheoretical knowledge (it would be 'practical' onlyinthe sense of being facilitated by willing). Beck attempts to head off this implication by sayingthat although we thereby conceive ourselvesa si ntelligible entities with an intelligible character, 'all conception of the intelligible escapes us and is unintelligible' (Beck 1796b, §217) . But this is hard to understand: if an original use of understandingyields intelligibility,why should an original use of practical reason not do so?A gain, Beck says in (Beck 1796b, §228)t hat the concept of freedom has 'no theoretical, objective validity',because it is 'onlya no riginal use of reason',which has 'no original use of understanding for abasis',but it is hard to understand whyitshould need to have such abasis.In (Beck 1796b, §214)B eckd raws an analogy with the transcendental unity of apperception, but does not sayw hat 'the original unity of practical reason' amounts to.  Beck says in (Beck 1796b, §240)t hat the agent'ss upposition that he will attain his end of achievingaholywill and that naturewill be consonant with amoral order leads him to believe in God, but that this belief does not connect with theoretical judgement,since it is nothingbut a confident hope (Beck 1796b, §241) . In (Beck 1796b, §249) Beckasserts that belief in God and immortality,r esting on am orallygood dispositiona imingatam oral world-order,constitutes religion and favours morality,b ut leavesi tu nclear whether he follows Kant'sm oral proof.  Schellingobjects that (amongother things) Beck'sp ostulateo fp rimordial representation is merely theoretical and rests on aconcept that it cannot make intelligible, viz. that of primordial representation (Schelling1994,p.118 [SW: I, 423] ), and 'leavespractical philosophywithout any foundation' (Schelling1 994,p .121 [SW: I, 427] ). Kant and Jacobi, by recruitingK antian resources to the defenceo faphilosophy of Glauben -to meet the demands, which Jacobi repudiates, of Wissenschaft,by giving a wissenschaftlich account of Glauben itself.
Fries takes it as given, in light of the criticisms of Schulzeand Maimon,that in general so-called transcendental proofs prove nothing of ontologicali mport: the Analogies of Experience for example show onlyt hath uman reason has the need to presuppose, das Bedürfnisv orauszusetzen,t he truth of theirp rinciples (Fries 1828,pp. xvii-xviii) .⁷² Kant'sso-called moral proofsofthe theological ideas are, in parallel, no more successful in getting us beyond mere necessities of representation: the arguments rest on the presupposition of moral consciousness, the necessity of which has merelyfactical, psychological status, and in any case they merelylead us in ac ircle (because, Fries claims, they show God, freedom and immortality to be in turn presuppositions of the validity of the moral law).⁷³ But instead of following Jacobi in rejecting wholesale the Critical endeavour,⁷⁴ Fries infers that transcendental enquiryshould be reconstrued as what he calls "philosophische Anthropologie",thatis, in the first instance, empirical psychology. What Kant'sm isunderstanding of his deductions as proofsbringsu sto see, Fries claims, here following Jacobi, is Kant'sp erpetration of the rationalist dogmatic "prejudice", Vorurtheil,t hat cognition presupposes proof. Once this prejudice is overcome, we are able to return with full confidence to the immediate convictions of natural consciousness,a nd these include, per Fries, the truth of Kant'spractical postulates: "we defend the rights of belief [Glauben] primarily by showing thatk nowledge,t oo, ariseso nlys ubjectively in reason" (Fries 1989, p. 69) .
Fries' reconstruction of the Critical philosophys alvagest hereforeal arge quantity of Kantian doctrine, includingK ant'st heism, while sacrificing entirely its foundations. This, on Fries' view,i st he proper lesson to be learnt from Jacobi'sc ritiqueo fK ant.The practical postulates are absorbed into sub-spheres of immediate cognition, initiallyi nto the provinceo fGlauben and subsequently into the sphere of affective or aesthetic cognition that Fries calls Ahnung. Kant'sinsight that moral consciousness provides sufficient attestation of the re- See also (Fries 1812, pp. 31-37) on Kant.  In Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung,F ries rejects the arguments that Kant givesfor the theological postulates on an umber of grounds.I nt he chapter 'On the Eternal Good' (Fries 1989, pp. 83 -87) . Fries describes the religious beliefs that Kant recommends as psychologicallyi mpossible, rejects Kant'sformulation of the highest good, and denies the coherenceofsupposing infinitetime to be sufficient for the attainmentofcompletevirtue; later he rejects the priority of freedom over the theological postulates (Fries 1989,p .90) .  See Fries' criticisms of Jacobii n ( Fries 1812, pp. 38 -53). ality of the supersensible objectsi sg eneralizedt oa ll purelyi ntellectual representations, and the propositions in Kant'st heological postulates are upheld in af orm which renders them immunet ot he objections levelled against Kant's moral theology, since Fries has abandoned the attempt to derivet hem from an antinomyo fp ractical reason.
Novalis
The concept of practical postulation allows us to also specify the parting of ways within the post-Kantian developmentofthe Romantics from the systematic idealists. Thisi sc learest in Novalis.⁷⁵ Novalis arrivest hrough reflection on Fichtea tt he idea thati ntentional, propositionallya rticulated consciousness is dependent on as ourcew hich can come before us onlyinthe shape of feeling. Whereas Fichtesupposesitpossible to stepbehind the scenes of natural consciousness and reverse its inverted image of reality,Novalis relinquishes the idea that we can achieveacognitive grasp, of the sort claimed by Fichte, of the non-conscious ground of our subjectivity.Our proper relation to this absoluteg round, after we have freelyr enounced it from the standpoint of cognition,⁷⁶ Novalis conceivesi nstead in terms of activitythe activity of, as he puts it,s eeking "connection [Verknüpfung]" with the whole, "enlargement [Verganzung]",o ft he subject'sc ompass to aw hole.
What Novalis has in mind by enlargement-and-connection-to-a-whole is the Romantisierung der Welt,which includes theoretical enquiry into nature -in appropriately naturphilosophisch forms -but onlyasasubsidiary component.I tis not,t herefore, equivalent to the extension of our cognition to the whole of nature, on the model of the Kantian understanding.⁷⁷ Nor,h owever,i si tp ractical in the usual sense, since it consists not in our changingt he world, but in our being changed by the world. Novalis says that we therebymanifest "the absolute ground of all grounding",the "freedom" in the ground, and become aware of our own "absolute freedom".This awareness,a nd the activity which makes it possible, constitutefurthermore a negative cognition of the absoluteground, which is given to us "insofar as we act and find that what we seek cannot be attained through action":t he "negatively known absolute" is "known through action" (Novalis 2003,p .168) .⁷⁸ Finally, Novalis says that all of this "could be called an absolute postulate", and we can see whyh ed oes so. Romanticization is positioned, as we have just seen, mid-waybetween theoretical and practical reason. In addition, Novalis explains thath ei so ffering the postulateo fe nlargement to aw hole in place of "searchingf or as ingle principle" (whichh ec ompares to the attempt to square the circle). Since Novalis is thinking here of postulates as alternativest op rinciples, we might ask what the differenceis-whycannot aproposition be both, as Fichtea nd Schellinga ssume.⁷⁹ The answer is thatN ovalis also thinks, as other passages in the Fichte-Studien make clear,that practical existence, wheni ta chieves its higher (that is, romantic) forms, exceeds what can be comprehended.⁸⁰ Fichtethinks that the act which his absolutepostulate enjoins can be grasped by philosophical reason -it can be observed, and modelled systematicallyi nt he Wissenschaftslehre. This is what Novalis denies. Novalis must of course agree that an imperative can point us in the direction of the required activity -Ic an think: Let me connect myself to the whole! -but the forms of activity which might satisfy the imperative cannot be determined discursively,a ny more than the concept of awork of art can determine the objects which satisfy it.The concept of an absolutepostulate marks then, for Novalis,anexit point for philosophical reflection, not,a si nF ichtea nd Schelling, the highest point within it.⁸¹  Novalis concludes the passage: 'Thus eternity is realized temporallyi nspiteo fthe fact that time contradicts eternity' (Novalis 2003,p.168) . Am odel for this conception of infinite approximation to an end as equivalent to its ultimaterealization is contained in Kant'smoral theology, where it is claimed that our infinitelyextended, posthumous strivingtoachieveholiness of will can be taken -by God -to count as its realization. The fact that Novalis compares negativepractical cognition of the absolute ground with achievinge ternity through time implies his awareness of this connection. See also (Novalis2 003,n o. 54,p p. 38 -39), concerning Kant'sp ostulates, practical striving, and duration. Ford etailed discussion of the practical and aesthetici n Novalis,s ee (Kneller 2007) .  In (Fichte 1992, p. 109 [FW/GA: IV, III, [343] [344] ), Fichteobjects to J. S. Beck, whomaintains af irst postulate rather than af irst principle, that he misconceivesp rinciples.( Schelling1 994, p. 112 [SW: I, 414] ), affirms that the Grundsatz of self-determination is ap ostulate.  See (Novalis 2003,no. 89,p.46) , where Novalis says that 'the practical I' is onlya'postulate' of the 'theoretical I':werepresent the practical I, and this representation is formed by takingthe idea of the theoretical Ia nd qualifyingi ta s' practical';i t' borrows' the idea of the unconditioned, the purelyfree. The genuine practical Iescapes representation and has onlyone expression: it 'commands pureand simple'.Assoon as we reflect on its efficacy, it is found to be theoretical.  What Novalis is proposingr eallya mounts to,t hen, is the (extraordinary and striking) thought that our lives -when livedromantically -are the solution to the basic problem of tran-Fichte'sp ost-Kantian epistemologya su nsuccessful, and invokes an affective or aesthetic substitute for the sought-after single principle. In all three cases, then, the proposed revisions involvearejection of the requirementofdiscursive demonstration.
The turn to non-discursivity has implications for the treatment of the relation between the theoretical sphere of understandinga nd the practical sphere of reason. The connection between the two is supplied on Beck'sa ccount,w e saw, by am ere thin parallel between theoretical and practical postulation, while Novalis envisages theoretical cognition as yielding at its limit to an aesthetic practice. Fries, by contrast,c onstrues nature -apprehended as beautiful or sublime -as an indeterminate Darstellung accessible to aesthetic feeling( Ahnung)ofthe reality that we attempt to grasp by means of the ideas of reason. This preserves more of the structure of the Critical system -Fries at least agrees with Kant concerning the existenceofathird category,intermediate between the theoretical and the practical -but it involves no conception of their unity and to that extent leavest he two spheres fundamentallyd istinct.B eck, Fries, and Novalis are therefore all united in abjuringt he augmented sense of practical postulate, the notion of as ingle discursive claim which expresses the unity of the theoretical and practical reason, or of Verstand and Vernunft.Interms of the historical narrativethat Iampursuing,these three thinkers represent pointswhere(respectively) the concept of apostulate, the moral theology, and the conception of the practical as outstripping the theoretical, become central to post-Kantian philosophy, but in away which does not conform to the philosophicalstrategyimplied by the augmented concept of apractical postulate, and so they disembark from the German Idealist line of post-Kantian development.
The final observation to make is that Beck and Fries, whether or not their proposals succeed in resolving some of the problems facing Kantian epistemology, make no progress in resolving the problem, highlighted by criticism of the moral theology, concerning our need for assurance of the objective reality of ideas of reason. Beck clearlyc annot provide this,f or the reason given( and indeed he does not pretend to do so), and Fries' invitation to regardfelt conviction of the reality of the ideas of reason as immediate cognition makes no obvious advance on Jacobi's salto mortale.⁸³  The precise problem reveals itself when the followingquestion is raised: Granted Fries' account of how we come to form ideas of reason, namelythroughn egation of the relational charactero ft he spatio-temporal objects of our Wissen,h ow do we come to suppose them to have objective reference,i .e.t obelieve in their reality? The difficulty for Fries lies in reconciling( i) his commitment to explanation of all cognition in terms of subjective powers and processes (as per Kant,a nd as required by philosophische Anthropologie), with (ii) his affirmation of the
5C onclusion
The preceding discussion has some bearing on the dispute concerning the metaphysical or non-metaphysical character of GermanI dealism.
Dieter Henrich has identified the long term historical importance of Kant's doctrine of postulation with (first) its contribution to the theological tradition which seeks to grasp God not metaphysicallyb ut through inner revelation, and (second) its role in the prehistory of pragmatism, laying the ground for Feuerbach and Nietzsche (Henrich 1960,p p. 187-188 note 1) . This pointst oa sharp contrastwith the German Idealists' reception of Kant'sdoctrine, where, despite the repudiation of Kant'stheism, what stands out is the maintained connection of practical postulation with the Ideal of Pure Reason. As Ih avet ried to show,while it is quite true that Fichteand Schelling detach the concept of apractical postulate from Kant'st heism, they do not thereupon convert it into am ere general principle of rational belief in the manner of pragmatism.⁸⁴ Fichtea nd Schellinginstead took Kant'smoral theologyasanincomplete model or preliminary sketch for as ystematic structure intended to completeametaphysical task with adistinctlyearlymodern flavour,viz., the task of conceptuallydetermining final ontological grounds.I fw ef ormulate the puzzle of German Idealism, as is often done, in terms of the question how the German Idealists could have considered it possiblet or estorem etaphysics in the wake of Kant'sC opernican revolution, the German Idealists' reception of Kant'smoral theologyhelps us to see how it should be answered. In the perspective of Fichtea nd Schelling,i tw as never an optiontoholdapart the theory of rational belief from ontological commitments: to have negatively circumscribed the task at hand -to have defined philosophical reflection as concernedwith epistemic and practical norms in opposition to metaphysics -would have led to the problems acutelyv isiblei n objective referenceo fi deas of reason (as per Jacobi). The problem arises,therefore,e venw hen Fries is allowed his claim that it is amistaket oaim at adiscursive proofofobjective reference. Fries is acutely awareofthe difficulty -see (Fries 1989,pp. 70,74-75) -for if it is not resolved, then Fries either falls prey to the objections levelled by Jacobia gainst Kant,orhas added nothing to Jacobi.  Schellingexplicitlyrejects the sufficiencyofamethodological conception in the Fifth of his Philosophische Briefe (Schelling1 980b, pp. 168 -171[ SW:I ,3 00 -305]). His targetc omprises ('anxiouslymodest')Kantians whosuppose that 'it is preciselythe exclusive use of practical postulates that distinguishes the critical philosopher'.S chelling counters that,i ng eneral terms, method is preciselyw hati sshared by opposings ystems,a nd that when practical postulation is conceivedasmere method, it does not contradict dogmatism but rather facilitates its renewal.
